Industry research and long-term investment cannot simply anchor the short-term fluctuations of the 1-3 year inventory cycle and the 8-15 year industry cycle, while ignoring the 20-50 year ultra-long bottom cycle that really determines the end of the industry and the value of long-term assets. Core variables such as population structure, energy change, underlying technology iteration, urbanization process, and the landing of alternative technologies all evolve on a decades-long scale. All short-term profits and losses, capacity fluctuations, and market fluctuations are only periodic disturbances in a long cycle. Only based on the ultra-long cycle perspective of 20-50 years, can we penetrate the cycle noise and grasp the long-term trend and ultimate income logic of the industry. Under the ultra-long cycle,
all industries will eventually be divided into three final forms, namely, incremental upward, stock shock and reduction downward, corresponding to different business rules, leading fate and capital gains model. The advantages of technology, cost and operation in a single cycle can only support the short-term survival of enterprises, while the ability of cross-cycle layout, counter-cyclical M & a integration and reshaping the industry structure is the core barrier to the final profit distribution. Based on the six ultimate cycle axioms as the underlying framework, this paper makes a long-term qualitative analysis of the four core industries of cement, polysilicon, pig breeding and computing power memory chips, disassembles the operation tactics, leading differences and capital endgame of each industry, and supports the corresponding long-term secondary market investment strategies.
First, the six bottom ultimate axioms (the core logic of the industry endgame, the long-term observation dimension of 20 – 50 years)
show that
the short-term inventory, supply and demand cycle is only 1 – 3 years; the medium-term industrial fluctuation cycle is 8 – 15 years; The ultra-long cycle that really determines the end of the industry and the final return of capital must be extended to 20 to 50 years. Demographic structure, energy transformation, iteration at the bottom of technology, the complete life cycle of industrialization and urbanization, and the implementation of industrial alternative technologies are all based on the evolution scale of 20 – 50 years, and all short-term and medium-term fluctuations are only periodic episodes in the ultra-long cycle.
Axiom 1: The low point of the long-term shock upward cycle (incremental period, 20 – 50 years)
is to rapidly expand high-quality production capacity, while the high point of the boom is only to cash in profits and not to invest in new heavy assets; the core source of income is the total growth dividend of the industry. From the perspective of 20 – 50 years, the incremental track continued to expand by relying on the underlying technology and social demand. Overcapacity and periodic losses in the middle of the process were all upward relay adjustments, and the long-term demand center continued to rise.
Axiom 2: Long-term high volatility platform cycle (stock surplus period, 20 – 50 years dimension)
will no longer increase the industry's total homogeneous production capacity, concentrate resources to strengthen its own cost and technological advantage production capacity, and continue to squeeze the industry's high-cost disadvantage production capacity clearance; The core income is the increase of industry concentration, cost price difference and structural subdivision dividend. In the dimension of 20 – 50 years, the overall demand ceiling of the track has peaked, the total volume has been sideways for a long time, and only structural opportunities have been subdivided. The industry has repeatedly staged a cycle of "expansion of production-surplus-loss-liquidation", and the pattern continues to be concentrated.
Axiom 3: Long-term downward shock cycle (reduction and contraction period, 20 – 50 years dimension)
, high point of boom rebound, cash flow hoarding, contraction of main business scale; low point of deep loss in the industry, merger and acquisition integration; after the completion of integration, backward and inefficient production capacity will be cleared in batches in a planned way to match the long-term shrinking demand; The core income comes from the oligopoly barrier dividend formed after the clearance of production capacity. From the perspective of 20 – 50 years, affected by the shrinking population, the substitution of the underlying technology and the long-term policy constraints, the demand center is irreversibly moving down year by year, the industry as a whole continues to shrink, and the value of stock assets is concentrated to a small number of integration entities.
Axiom 4: The short-term and medium-term cycles are completely subject to the short-term fluctuations of 1 – 3 years and the medium-term industrial fluctuations of 8 – 15 years brought about by the price, inventory and supply and demand of the ultra-long cycle
of 20 – 50 years, which only affect the timing of operation; The ultra-long industrial cycle of 20-50 years determines the long-term viability of enterprises, the ceiling of asset value and the final return of investment. From the long-term perspective of 20 – 50 years, it is easy to be misled by the periodic boom or recession, and make decisions to expand production and invest against the final outcome.
Axiom 5: Super external capital harvesting axiom (adapting to the long-term perspective of 20 – 50 years)
Long-term high volatility platform period, long-term downward volatility period (stock and reduction stage under the scale of 20 – 50 years), endogenous enterprises in the industry are generally under cash flow pressure and short-term profit-seeking. The Company was unable to complete the in-depth integration of the whole industry; the super-large-scale long-term external capital pursuing the long-term return of 20 – 50 years was involved at a low level against the trend, and continued to merge and acquire in several cycles, accelerating the clearance of production capacity and the permanent remodeling of the industry structure, and eventually became the largest profit reaper in the middle and late stages of the industry and in the end. Industry leaders can only grasp a single round and two rounds of medium-term cycles, and external long-term capital can go through multiple rounds of complete 20-50 years of ultra-long cycles.
Axiom 6: The fatalistic axiom of industry leaders (adapting to the long-term perspective of 20 – 50 years)
Most of the original industry leaders rely on single-round and two-round market battles to win, and their core advantages focus on production costs, process technology and refined operation; Corporate genes, management thinking and organizational structure are highly biased towards short-term production and operation and product competition, and generally lack the top-level thinking of capital operation, large-scale merger and acquisition integration across multiple cycles and stock pattern remodeling under the dimension of 20-50 years. Special case supplement: axiom popular interpretation (20 – 50 long cycle perspective)
upward incremental cycle (20 – 50 Year): In the competition of technology, cost and capacity expansion, the industrial leader dominates the medium-term cycle; but in the extension of 20 – 50 years, the capital reserve and the ability of counter-cyclical integration determine the final outcome.
Platform surplus, downward reduction cycle (20 – 50 years): competing for cross-cycle cash reserves, continuous merger and acquisition integration capabilities, decades of cycle tolerance, external super long-term capital with crushing advantages;
core genes of ordinary industrial leaders: single-cycle production, competition, short-term technology iteration; Conch Cement superimposes cross-cycle merger and acquisition integration genes, with scarce long-term valuation revaluation potential; external long-term capital core genes: through multiple cycles of counter-cyclical acquisitions, long-term monopoly pattern building;
From the perspective of the ultra-long cycle of 20 – 50 years, after the industry enters the stage of stock, surplus and deep integration, the advantages of capital operation and cross-cycle layout will completely surpass the advantages of pure production and operation. Conch Cement has independent long-term allocation value and ten times of market value growth space by virtue of its own sustainable integration ability.
Cement industry (has entered the third stage: a downward reduction cycle of long-term shocks, a long-term qualitative cycle of 20 – 50 years)
(I) Qualitative cycle (a long-term perspective of 20 – 50 years)
The total domestic demand for cement will peak in 2021. Extending the 20-50 year dimension, the total population will continue to decline, the urbanization process will be completely completed, the demand for renewal of stock buildings will decrease year by year, and the low-carbon alternative materials will be iterated for a long time, and the demand center will continue to move down irreversibly; Industry-wide (II) Industry-wide Standard Business Tactics (Adapt 20 – 50 The high point of economic rebound in the next business cycle
: fully withdraw operating cash flow, substantially reduce interest-bearing liabilities, divest non-mining, high energy consumption and inefficient assets, continue to reserve large amounts of special funds for cross-cycle mergers and acquisitions, and resolutely refrain from building new clinker production capacity; Low point of deep loss in
the industry: only acquire the core assets of high-quality limestone mine, supporting aggregate merchant-mix integration and low energy consumption new dry process stock, and never build new production lines; Closing actions of
integration: there are plans to shut down 2500t/d and below old clinker lines and high-carbon backward grinding capacity in batches, and reduce the total supply of the industry through capacity reduction and replacement, so as to match the long-term shrinking demand in the coming decades;
Transformation of supporting layout: Long-term development of the second curve of the weak cycle of solid waste co-processing, CCUS low-carbon cement, prefabricated aggregate building materials, etc., continue to reduce the proportion of revenue from traditional clinker business, and hedge the downward pressure of long-term demand for 20 – 50 years.
(III) Fate of leading enterprises and capital endgame + differentiation analysis of Conch Cement (20 – 50 years perspective)
Ordinary regional cement leading enterprises: they are only good at local production, cost control and regional peak staggering and coordination in a single round of medium-term cycle. Lack of top-level design spanning decades, large-scale cross-regional mergers and acquisitions, capital restructuring, long-term capacity clearance, lengthening the 20-50 year cycle, long-term can only passively wait for state-owned, central enterprises and other external long-term capital to complete the ultimate integration of the industry;
Conch Cement's core advantages of scarcity and differentiation (adapting to the next 20-50 year business cycle) ① It is the only cement leader in China with decades of complete cross-regional M & a system, which has experienced several rounds of bottom acquisition cycles in the industry, and has mastered the whole set of integration processes of low-cost acquisition, capacity replacement, closure of old production lines and regional market synergy. It has the ability of continuous integration across multiple cycles; (2) It holds the core scarce resources of national high-quality limestone mines and logistics terminals along the Yangtze River, and its operating cash flow is the first in the industry for a long time. At the bottom of each round of losses in the next long cycle, it has the financial strength of independent large-scale mergers and acquisitions, and does not rely entirely on external capital to carry out industry reshuffling; (3) Short board constraints: the corporate culture at the bottom is still centered on industrial cost control, the global industry structure has been reshaped for decades, and the ability of cross-industry large-scale capital operation is weaker than that of national external long-term industrial capital. The final oligopoly profits will be divided up by external capital, but Conch can continue to share the dividends of continuous market share increase brought by each round of integration in the long cycle of 20 – 50 years.
(IV) Investment strategy in the secondary market (long-term perspective of 20 – 50 years, new prediction of long-term market value space of Conch)
General operating rules of the industry: only at the absolute bottom of the deep loss of the whole industry and the shutdown of a large number of cement plants, regional leaders with mine resources and long-term integration expectations of state-owned assets will be laid out; Each round of boom profit repair high in batches to reduce positions, only to do medium-term band operations, not long-term holding through decades of cycles;
Conch Cement exclusive allocation strategy (long-term core supplement): from the perspective of 20-50 years of ultra-long cycle, the bottom of each round of deep losses in the industry can be held cautiously for a long time, which is different from the logic of ordinary cement enterprises only doing band; Supporting logic:
industry fault cost advantage, abundant and continuous cash flow, the industry's first ability to resist losses in each downward cycle;
Scarce cross-cycle merger and acquisition integration experience, 20 – 50 years in the long cycle of each round of industry clearing stage, independent acquisition of small and medium-sized factories, high-quality mines, continue to increase long-term market share, industry concentration continues to concentrate to the head; We will
stabilize the cash flow of high dividends, continue to increase shareholder returns, and adapt to the long-term bottom position allocation for decades.
We will simultaneously lay out the long-term aggregate, commercial mix and low-carbon CCUS business to hedge the downward pressure on the long-term demand for cement for 20 – 50 years and open the second growth curve; Prediction of
long-term market value space: Relying on the triple logic of continuous clearing of the industry, solidification of oligopoly pattern and revaluation of the second curve valuation of low-carbon building materials, the market value of Conch Cement held in the long term has a huge room for growth, and the market value of the long-term dimension of 20 – 50 years can increase by 10 to 20 times under the optimistic scenario. Risk constraints: lengthen the 20-50 year cycle, the industry demand center continues to move down, there is no total growth market, the core income comes from the concentration of dozens of cycles, the liquidation of backward production capacity, the increase of M & a assets, and the remodeling of low-carbon business valuation; it is not allowed to hold heavy positions with high valuation, and it is not allowed to play a short-term game with a single round of boom, and it is only suitable to build positions in batches at the bottom of each round and hold them for a long time as value positions; If the progress of industry integration is not as expected and the landing of low-carbon business is slow, the actual increase will be 10-20 times lower than optimistic expectation.
Polysilicon industry (the second stage: long-term high volatility platform stock surplus cycle, 20 – 50 years long cycle qualitative)
(1) Cycle qualitative (20 – 50 years long cycle perspective)
The global photovoltaic installed capacity only maintained a low growth in the medium term. With the extension of 20-50 years, the global energy penetration rate has gradually peaked, new energy storage, solar thermal, hydrogen and other alternative energy technologies have matured, the growth rate of new photovoltaic installed capacity has continued to decline, and the total demand of the industry has entered a decades-long platform fluctuation range; Overcapacity in the current industry 2.7 – 3.
(II) Industry-side standard operation tactics (adapting to a long platform cycle of 20 – 50 years)
Construction of new production lines for silicon materials for general high energy-consuming SIEMENS will be completely stopped. To avoid further aggravating the industry surplus in the dimension of decades in each boom stage;
to concentrate resources to increase the production capacity with differentiation advantages: self-provided low-cost green power base, granular silicon, N-type high-purity compound feeding, electronic grade semiconductor silicon materials, continue to widen the cost gap with high energy-consuming small and medium-sized enterprises, and continue to squeeze out inferior production capacity in dozens of cycles; Each round of downward loss cycle of the
industry: relying on the advantages of electricity price, integration and process cost to maintain production, withstand the price war, and force the old small and medium-sized silicon enterprises without green power matching and high debt to stop production and withdraw permanently;
Short-term small rebound boom window: cash spot profits in full, reduce interest-bearing liabilities, and retain sufficient cross-cycle cash flow as funds for each round of bottom mergers and acquisitions in the next few decades;
smooth cycle support: long-term downstream layout of silicon wafers, self-supporting photovoltaic power plants, and internal digestion of self-produced silicon materials; Continuous iteration of cold hydrogenation and waste heat recovery technology, long-term reduction of unit production costs, through multiple cycles.
(3) Fate of leading enterprises and capital endgame (20-50 years long-term perspective)
Polysilicon leading enterprises belong to industrial enterprises with process, production and cost control, and are good at single-round cycle equipment technology transformation, yield improvement and energy consumption optimization; It lacks the thinking of large-scale counter-cyclical mergers and acquisitions spanning decades, long-term restructuring of industry stock and capital monopoly operation. Standing at the end of the long cycle of 20 – 50 years: the original industry leader can only survive a single round, two rounds of cycles, and eliminate small manufacturers; External green power capital, energy central enterprises and long-term industrial funds, which pursue long-term returns for decades, acquire core silicon materials and industrial silicon assets at a low price at the bottom of each round of the industry, complete the monopoly of the whole industry pattern after several rounds of integration, and reap long-term oligopoly profits in the platform cycle of 20 – 50 years.
(4) The secondary market investment strategy (20-50 years long-term perspective)
does not participate in a single round of short-term rebound in the market, and does not catch up with the high level; After the price of silicon materials falls below the cash cost of the whole industry in each round and the second-line high energy-consuming production capacity is permanently suspended, the leading enterprises with self-owned green power, differentiated technology and external long-term capital integration expectation will be laid out. The long-term income source for decades is the upward shift of the valuation center brought by the continuous liquidation of inefficient production capacity in dozens of cycles and the permanent remodeling of the industry structure. Large-scale
pig farming industry (Phase II: long-term high volatility platform stock cycle, 20 – 50 years long cycle qualitative)
(I) Cycle qualitative (20 – 50 years long cycle perspective)
The total per capita pork consumption of domestic residents peaked in the medium term. Extending the 20-50 year dimension, the total population will decline, beef and mutton, poultry meat and artificial protein will replace pork for a long time, the overall demand of the industry will shrink steadily and slowly for a long time, and there will be no incremental dividend. The decades dimension will completely enter the stage of stock cost game, and the profit of the industry will only depend on the short-term supply and demand mismatch of each round of pig price.
(2) The standard operation tactics at the industrial end (adapting to the long cycle of 20-50 years platform)
stop the disorderly expansion of the total scale of breeding sows, tilt the breeding technology and intelligent breeding equipment for long-term resources, continuously reduce the cost of pig breeding, and form a cross-cycle cost barrier;
In each downward cycle of deep loss of pig price, high-cost retail investors and small pig farms are continuously squeezed for permanent liquidation by relying on cost advantage;
in each boom profit peak, bank loans are repaid and cross-cycle operating cash flow is retained; at the bottom of the cycle, only small mergers and acquisitions of high-quality mature pig farms are carried out, and no radical new breeding bases are built;
Long-term cycle hedging layout: continue to expand slaughtering, prefabricated meat deep processing and supermarket terminal channels to smooth the cyclical fluctuations of pig prices in the coming decades. Fate of
leading enterprises and capital endgame (20-50 years long-term perspective)
The core competence of leading enterprises in pig breeding is focused on pig breeding, on-farm management and breeding cost control in a single cycle, and they do not have the ability to restructure the whole industry and integrate large-scale continuous capital mergers and acquisitions spanning decades. Extending the 20-50 year cycle, the industry will suffer losses in each round of long-term shocks, and the financial pressure of private enterprises will continue to expand. In the next few decades, the industry concentration will increase significantly, mainly relying on the long-term industrial capital of state-owned agriculture to complete several rounds of bottom integration.
(4) Investment strategy in the secondary market (20-50 years long-term perspective)
At present, the overall stock price and valuation of the sector are at a high level in a single cycle, so we should keep a wait-and-see attitude and not hold heavy positions; At the bottom of each round of sustained and deep losses of the whole industry and the continuous decline of breeding sows, the head breeding enterprises with multi-dimensional advantages of breeding, cost and terminal channels are laid out. At the stage of each round of sharp rise in pig prices and consistent optimism in the market, the head breeding enterprises realize medium-term gains and leave the market, and do not hold the long cycle of decades.
5. Computing & memory chip industry (Nvidia/Samsung/Changxin Storage/Changjiang Storage, long-term shock upward cycle, 20-50 years long cycle qualitative,
(I) Qualitative cycle (long-term perspective of 20 – 50 years)
Long-term general trend (20 – 50 years): AI computing power, automotive electronics, industrial chips and Internet of Everything continue to expand their application boundaries, and the demand for computing power and storage continues to expand in the long run. As a whole, it is in a long-term shock upward cycle and has not yet entered the high platform; there is still a 5-8 year medium-term buffer from the downward cycle of the bottom silicon-based technology bottleneck and the long-term shrinkage of demand, and there is still room for multi-level technology iteration increment in 20-50 years. Short-term core contradiction (single-round medium-term cycle): the advanced construction of AI computing power gave birth to the current round of super boom in the industry, and the huge profits in the industrial chain stimulated the global manufacturers to collectively expand production on a large scale; The new production capacity of general DRAM, consumer NAND, low-end inference GPU and ordinary mature process will be released in a concentrated manner from 2027 to 2028, and the industry will have a phased and comprehensive overcapacity, which will lead to a short-term and in-depth adjustment of the loss of the whole industry, and usher in a fierce stock involution, which belongs to a medium callback in the long upward cycle of 20 to 50 years.
(2) Countercyclical standard operation tactics of leading manufacturers (adapting to the 20-50 year business cycle, implemented by Nvidia, Samsung, Changxin and Changjiang Storage)
Current super boom high point: strictly control capital expenditure and suppress the impulse of investment in homogeneous production capacity. Steady development in the long term of 20 – 50 years of service ① Suspend large-scale new projects of general storage, low-end reasoning GPU and old mature manufacturing processes to avoid overdrawing the profit margin of the industry in the coming decades in this round of expansion; (2) Only for high-end scarce barrier capacity (high-end AI GPU, HBM, vehicle-level DRAM, enterprise-level high-durability NAND), carry out small technological transformation of process and yield, and build technical barriers for decades; (3) Fulfill the current excess earnings, significantly reduce interest-bearing liabilities, hoard massive cross-cycle free cash flow, avoid the risk of large asset impairment caused by this round of overcapacity, and reserve M & a funds for the bottom of dozens of cycles in the future. At the bottom of
each round of industry overcapacity and deep loss of the whole industry: liberalize the expansion of high-quality high-end production capacity, merge and integrate against the trend, and consolidate the long-term share advantage of 20-50 years. Acquisition of idle wafer factories, advanced packaging production lines, and subdivided computing/storage design enterprises at a low price; (2) targeted increase of high-end differentiated production capacity with high barriers, and determined not to lay out the low-end homogeneous track; (3) Relying on the long-term upward dividends of the track for 20 – 50 years, the Company continued to expand its market share at a very low cost, and completely widened the volume gap with the second-tier manufacturers in the dimension of decades.
Long-term smooth cycle supporting actions (adapting to the long cycle of 20 – 50 years) Sign 3 – 5 years long-term agreement and rolling contract renewal with cloud manufacturers, automobile enterprises and AI enterprises to lock in decades of long-term shipments; vertically lay out computing services and storage module business to digest its own chips; Long-term self-developed semiconductor equipment and key materials to reduce the cross-cycle impact of external supply chain.
Nvidia, Samsung, Changxin and Changjiang Storage are all technological leaders in technology research and development, process iteration and product definition. Their core genes are single-cycle technological innovation and product market competition, and they are good at developing new incremental tracks in the medium term. However, there is an extreme lack of long-term capital operation thinking spanning decades, large-scale and sustained mergers and acquisitions across enterprises, long-term liquidation of the stock of the whole industry, and monopoly of the pattern. In the stage of single round of overcapacity and continuous loss of the industry, the leading technology leader can only rely on technical barriers to protect itself and passively eliminate small and medium-sized manufacturers; the long cycle of 20 – 50 years will be extended to truly cover the whole industry chain and multiple rounds of deep integration across regions, which will be led by external super long-term capital such as global sovereign funds and national semiconductor long-term funds. In the second half of the upward long cycle, after each round of adjustment, the high-end computing power and storage oligopoly monopolize excess profits, and the final earnings of decades of dimensions are mainly harvested by large-scale long-term external capital.
(IV) Investment strategy in the secondary market (20-50 years long-term perspective)
The current computing power and HBM storage are at the high level of the current round of mid-term boom, and the low-end computing power and ordinary storage subject matter without core technology and ecological barriers are cleared; Retain only the small long-term bottom positions of exclusive technical barrier leaders such as Nvidia, Changxin and Changjiang Storage;
wait for the medium-term bottom range of centralized release of new production capacity, destocking of the whole industry chain and deep stock price correction from 2027 to 2028, and then increase the layout in batches; The main line of
20 – 50-year long-term investment continued to switch: from the growth logic of "selling shovels" of short-term upstream equipment to the final logic of high-end barrier products + multiple rounds of mergers and acquisitions of external long-term large capital, and continued to avoid the track of general storage and low-end computing power with great supply elasticity and serious homogenization for a long time.
6. Industry-wide cross-cycle ultimate summary (unified 20-50 year long-term cycle perspective)
General rules for long-term upward incremental cycle (20-50 years) Industrial operation: strictly control homogeneous production expansion and hoard cross-cycle cash at the peak of each short-term boom; At the bottom of each round of short-term deep decline, we expanded high-quality and high-barrier production capacity against the trend, and fully shared the long-term total growth dividends of the industry with a long cycle of 20 – 50 years. The chip industry is currently in the mid-term boom bubble stage of the long-term upward cycle, and the core action is to restrain the impulse of this round of expansion, reserve long-term funds for decades, and wait for the bottom of the industry loss to expand. Investment logic: reduce the subject matter of each round of boom, and only retain the long-term bottom position of the core barrier leader; after each round of deep callback in the industry, the high-quality assets of the heavy position track will share the increment of decades of technology iteration.
Long-term high fluctuation platform cycle (the current stage of polysilicon and live pigs, 20 – 50 years) Industrial operation: permanently stop adding new homogeneous total production capacity of the industry, continue to strengthen the production capacity with its own cost and technological advantages, and continue to squeeze the inferior production capacity for dozens of cycles; Special funds for cross-cycle mergers and acquisitions are retained at the high point of each boom, and high-quality stock assets are slightly integrated at the bottom of each industry. Investment logic: only do single cycle leading band operation, high valuation boom high wait-and-see position reduction, only in each round of industry deep loss bottom batch layout, not one-time heavy position through decades of cycle.
Long-term downward reduction cycle (the current stage of cement, 20 – 50 years) Industrial operation: shrink the traditional main business and recover cross-cycle cash flow at the peak of each round of boom rebound; acquire high-quality stock core assets at the bottom of each round of industry, and take the initiative to liquidate backward production capacity after the completion of integration, so as to match the long-term shrinking demand in the coming decades. Investment general standards: only in each round of the bottom of the industry layout with long-term integration of state-owned assets is expected to lead, each round of market rebound at high points to reduce positions to do the band; Special case: As Conch Cement has a mature multi-cycle merger and acquisition integration system, from the perspective of a long cycle of 20 – 50 years, the bottom of each round of the industry can be held cautiously for a long time. It is optimistically expected that the long-term market value can rise by 10 – 20 times, earning dozens of rounds of mergers and acquisitions, continuous improvement of concentration, and multiple dividends of low-carbon transformation. Short-term speculation on a single round of boom is prohibited.
Unified bottom cycle law (anchor 20 – 50 years long cycle) 1 – 3 years short-term supply and demand, inventory small cycle, 8 – 15 years medium-term industrial fluctuation cycle, only determine the short-term operation timing of enterprise expansion and capital trading; The ultra-long industrial cycle of 20-50 years determines the long-term life and death of enterprises for decades, the long-term value of assets and the ceiling of the final return of investment. The core advantages of ordinary industrial leaders are single-round track development, medium-term technological competition, and surviving short-term losses; the core advantages of external ultra-long-term large-scale capital are to go through dozens of counter-cyclical bottom mergers and acquisitions, reshape the long-term pattern of the industry, and finally reap the final oligopoly profits of the industry at the end of the long cycle of 20 – 50 years. Segmentation and differentiation supplement: the vast majority of industrial leaders do not have the ability of continuous merger and acquisition integration across the cycle, lengthening the 20-50 year cycle, and the final profits of the industry will be harvested by external long-term capital; Conch Cement, as a special case in the cement industry, has the ultimate cost advantage and a complete multi-cycle merger and acquisition integration system. It is the only local industry leader suitable for long-term bottom warehouse allocation for decades in the long downward cycle, with a long-term upward potential of ten to twenty times the market value. In view of the chip industry which is still in the long-term upward cycle of 20-50 years, the expansion of the whole industry chain brought about by the advanced construction of computing power in this round is only a medium-term stage bubble; Leading manufacturers can avoid the risk of large asset impairment as long as they restrain their investment impulse in the current boom stage, retain long-term funds and wait for the industry to expand at the bottom of medium-term losses. At the same time, they can continue to widen the long-term competitive gap with second-tier manufacturers by relying on the long-term increment of the track from 20 to 50 years. In the
risk warning
, the market value of Conch Cement increased by 10 to 20 times, which is a long-term optimistic scenario of 20 to 50 years. There are multiple constraints: population decline faster than expected, low-carbon environmental protection policies continue to raise production costs, the progress of cross-regional mine and capacity mergers and acquisitions is not as expected, the development of aggregates and CCUS low-carbon second curve is slow, state-owned external capital competes for core M & a resources, and market valuation remains low for a long time, all of which will reduce the long-term growth space. It is only used as a reference for long-term value deduction.All the industrial management strategies and secondary market operation ideas
in this paper are only the logical deduction of the industrial cycle, and do not constitute any investment advice for individual stocks. There are multiple uncontrollable risks in the capital market, such as policy, supply and demand, macro liquidity, geography, etc. Investment needs to be made independently and prudently. The long cycle of
20 – 50 years is an ultra-long-term deduction. Black swan events such as technological subversion in the middle, top-level industrial policy adjustment and sudden change of social demand structure will change the original cycle operation path and final pattern of the industry.
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